GR 148326; (November, 2001) (Digest)
G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001.
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Pablo C. Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for Congressman in Davao del Sur’s First District in the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed a consolidated petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Villaber and cancel his certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged that Villaber was convicted by final judgment in 1990 for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and that this crime involves moral turpitude, disqualifying him under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Cagas also asserted Villaber made a false material representation regarding his eligibility.
Villaber countered that his conviction was not final due to a lack of remand for promulgation and, even if final, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. The COMELEC Second Division, on April 30, 2001, granted Cagas’s petition, disqualifying Villaber and canceling his certificate of candidacy. It ruled that a B.P. Blg. 22 conviction involves moral turpitude, citing People vs. Tuanda. Villaber’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc on May 10, 2001.
ISSUE
Whether or not a conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying a candidate under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, dismissing the petition. The Court held that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances. Analyzing the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, the Court found the act of issuing a worthless check is intrinsically fraudulent. It involves deceit, constitutes a breach of trust, and is patently injurious to public welfare, thus involving moral turpitude defined as an act of baseness contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The Court upheld its ruling in Tuanda that such violation involves moral turpitude, rejecting Villaber’s argument that the penalty modification in Vaca and Rosa Lim cases altered this character. The Court clarified that the deletion of imprisonment in those cases, based on the philosophy of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, did not absolve the act of its inherent moral turpitude. Consequently, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Villaber.