G.R. No. 148194; April 12, 2002
WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Willy Tan was convicted of bigamy by the Regional Trial Court on December 12, 1996, and sentenced to prision correccional in its medium period. On December 23, 1996, he applied for probation. The trial court granted his probation application on January 8, 1997, but withheld the release order after the prosecution filed a motion for modification of the penalty on January 21, 1997. The prosecution argued that the correct penalty for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor, making petitioner ineligible for probation. Initially, the trial court denied the motion as the decision had become final, but upon reconsideration, it rendered an amended decision on July 10, 1998, sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court on July 13, 1998. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on August 18, 2000, ruling that it raised a pure question of law, which is exclusively within the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution, and that the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari, not a notice of appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on May 18, 2001.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it raised a pure question of law, which is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not treating the appeal as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
3. Whether the trial court’s amended decision, which increased the penalty after petitioner had applied for probation, is valid.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. The trial court’s amended judgment is SET ASIDE, and its original decision of December 12, 1996, is REINSTATED.
1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Under Section 3(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is taken by filing a notice of appeal. The rule is plain and unambiguous; the remedy of ordinary appeal by notice of appeal is available to petitioner. Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power to hear appeals involving only errors of law; the Court of Appeals is authorized to determine errors of fact, of law, or both under Rules 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to criminal cases.
2. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy because it can only be resorted to when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Appeal was still available to petitioner, making a petition for certiorari premature.
3. The trial court’s amended decision is void. When petitioner applied for probation after the original conviction, the judgment became final. Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that a judgment becomes final, inter alia, when the accused has applied for probation. This implements Section 4 of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended), which provides that the filing of a probation application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Such waiver amounts to voluntary compliance with the decision, rendering it final and beyond the trial court’s power to amend or modify, except to correct clerical errors. The trial court’s attempt to increase the penalty after the judgment had become final was unwarranted and violated petitioner’s right against double jeopardy.