G.R. No. 146875; July 14, 2003
Kagawads Jose G. Mendoza, Rosario B. Espino, Teresita S. Mendoza, Jorge Banal, Chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against Elected Barangay Officials of the Quezon City Council and Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., City Mayor of Quezon City, petitioners, vs. Barangay Captain Manuel D. Laxina, Sr., respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was the duly proclaimed and elected Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 elections. His rival, Roque Fermo, filed an election protest. On January 18, 1999, the Metropolitan Trial Court declared Fermo the winner. Respondent appealed. The trial court granted Fermo’s motion for execution pending appeal, prompting respondent to vacate the office on January 20, 1999. However, the COMELEC, on September 16, 1999, annulled the execution order for lack of good reason and ordered Fermo to relinquish the position back to respondent pending appeal. A writ was issued on October 27, 1999. Fermo refused to vacate, but respondent and his staff began discharging functions from an alternative location on October 28, 1999, and he made appointments to barangay secretary and treasurer. Respondent formally retook his oath of office before the City Mayor on November 16, 1999, and Fermo turned over barangay assets the next day.
Petitioners, barangay councilors, filed an administrative complaint against respondent, alleging grave misconduct. They contended that respondent and his appointees fraudulently claimed salaries for services rendered from November 8, 1999, when his valid reassumption and authority to appoint only commenced upon his oath-taking on November 16, 1999. The Quezon City Council’s Special Investigation Committee found respondent guilty, ruling he had no power to act prior to his oath. Respondent challenged this before the Regional Trial Court, which granted his motion for summary judgment and set aside the administrative decision.

ISSUE

Whether the taking of a new oath of office is a condition sine qua non for the validity of a duly proclaimed elective official’s reassumption to office, upon a COMELEC order for the incumbent to relinquish the position, such that any official act prior to the oath is invalid.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s summary judgment, ruling that a new oath was not a mandatory precondition for respondent’s valid reassumption and exercise of authority. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the COMELEC’s order and the doctrine of relation of acts. The COMELEC’s September 16, 1999 Resolution, which annulled the execution pending appeal and ordered Fermo to cease and desist and relinquish the office to respondent, was immediately executory. This order effectively restored respondent to his position as the rightful holder of the office pending the final appeal. His subsequent oath-taking on November 16, 1999, was a mere ministerial formality confirming a status already conferred by the COMELEC’s directive. Consequently, his acts performed upon the COMELEC’s order—including the discharge of duties from October 28 and the subsequent appointments—were valid and effective. The Court emphasized that the authority of a public officer relates back to the date of the entitlement to the office. Therefore, respondent and his appointees were entitled to compensation from the date they фактически began serving under the lawful order of the COMELEC, not merely from the later date of the ceremonial oath. The administrative finding of grave misconduct was correctly overturned.