GR 145945; (June, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 145945 ; June 27, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. VICTOR SUBIDA, Respondent.
FACTS
Victor Subida was charged with illegal possession of ammunition and two counts of frustrated homicide. After the prosecution rested, the trial court set multiple hearing dates for the defense to present evidence. On the initial dates, hearings were postponed due to the judge’s illness and the defense counsel’s alleged sickness. Subida himself testified on April 22, 1999. Subsequent settings for his witness, Jobel Mantes, were cancelled due to the witness’s non-appearance and the public prosecutor’s indisposition. On May 27, 1999, the defense counsel again failed to appear without explanation. Consequently, the trial court deemed Subida to have rested his case and submitted the cases for decision. Subida, through new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching affidavits from his intended witnesses, but it was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in deeming the defense to have rested its case and submitting the case for decision due to counsel’s single unexcused absence, thereby depriving Subida of his right to due process.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision nullifying the trial court’s orders. The right to be heard is a fundamental component of due process. While a client is generally bound by the negligence of his counsel, this rule admits exceptions when the application would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property due to the counsel’s gross or palpable negligence. Here, the defense counsel’s failure to appear on May 27, 1999, without prior notice or a motion for postponement, constituted gross negligence. This single, unexcused absence, which effectively foreclosed Subida’s opportunity to present crucial witness testimony, was a denial of his constitutional right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court’s outright submission of the case for decision, without first ensuring that Subida’s right to be heard was adequately protected, was a precipitate action amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The affidavits of the intended witnesses indicated their testimony was substantial for the defense, making the denial of their presentation a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court to allow Subida to present his evidence.