GR 145184; (March, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 145184; March 14, 2008
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY. ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, Petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES’ MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME – RAFAEL SISON, JOSEPH TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH EDRALIN, ROBERTO ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN, RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,* AMBROSIO MAKALINTAL, VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO, HORACIO MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE LOS ANGELES, JOSE REY D. RUEDA, RAMONCITO MODESTO, GERARDO LIMJUCO, Respondents.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, through the PCGG, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against officers of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Integrated Circuits Philippines, Inc. (ICPI). The complaint alleged that a 1980 loan granted by DBP to ICPI constituted a behest loan, characterized by undue haste in approval, under-collateralization, and the borrower’s undercapitalization, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Committee based its findings on criteria from Memorandum Order No. 61, which outlines indicators of behest loans.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, finding no probable cause. The Ombudsman determined that the loan approval followed DBP’s regular procedures, the collateral was sufficient based on DBP’s own appraisal, and ICPI’s capital was adequate per the General Banking Act. The Committee filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE
Did the Office of the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause?
RULING
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is a function constitutionally vested in the Ombudsman, and courts will not interfere absent a clear showing of grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found that the Ombudsman’s resolution was based on a careful evaluation of the evidence. The Ombudsman correctly noted that the mere presence of some criteria from Memorandum Order No. 61 does not automatically establish criminal liability for graft. The Ombudsman found that the loan was processed with due diligence, the collateral met banking standards, and there was no evidence of bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross negligence on the part of the DBP officials. Furthermore, there was no proof of conspiracy between the lenders and the borrowers to defraud the government. The Ombudsman’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to secure a conviction was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the petition was denied, and the Ombudsman’s dismissal order was affirmed.