GR 145153; (January, 2002) (Digest)
G.R. No. 145153; January 25, 2002
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THELMA M. MARANAN, EDUARDO A. MACARAIG, ERMELINDA MACATANGAY, JAIME MANDIGMA, CARMEN DAYO, HELEN MENDOZA and all other SQUATTER FAMILIES OCCUPYING THE EXPANDED PORTION OF THE DELINEATED BATANGAS PORT ZONE, respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from an ejectment suit filed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) against respondent squatter families occupying a portion of the Batangas Port Zone. During the pendency of the case, the Regional Trial Court, in an Order dated April 19, 1996, held PPA liable for damages for demolishing the respondents’ structures despite the ongoing litigation. The court ordered PPA to indemnify the respondents based on a specific formula involving their counterclaim. The Court of Appeals affirmed this order, prompting PPA to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the parties pursued an amicable settlement. The PPA Board, upon advice of the Government Corporate Counsel, authorized the execution of a Compromise Agreement. The respondents, through Special Powers of Attorney, appointed Thelma M. Maranan to represent them. Subsequently, the parties jointly submitted a Compromise Agreement dated November 28, 2001, to the Supreme Court for judicial approval.
ISSUE
Whether the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties should be approved by the Court.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court approved the Compromise Agreement. The Court emphasized that compromise is a favored means of settling disputes to achieve peace and avoid prolonged litigation. For judicial approval, a compromise must be freely and voluntarily executed by the parties, must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, and must represent a mutual concession.
The Court scrutinized the submitted agreement and found it legally acceptable. It was established that the parties, through their authorized representatives, entered into the agreement freely and intelligently. The terms involved a mutual concession: the respondents agreed to a reduced settlement amount and a quitclaim, while PPA agreed to pay compensation to resolve the case finally. Nothing in the agreement’s terms was found to be contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public policy. Consequently, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in accordance with the Compromise Agreement and enjoined the parties to abide by its terms and conditions.