GR 144374; (November, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 144374 November 11, 2005
Romeo Teston, represented by Conrado Colarina, Petitioner, vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, Land Bank of the Philippines, and Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Romeo Teston, through his attorney-in-fact Conrado Colarina, filed a complaint (SCC No. 4243) against respondents DBP, LBP, and the DAR Secretary for determination and payment of just compensation for two parcels of agricultural land. Teston alleged he purchased the lands from DBP via a Deed of Conditional Sale, later voluntarily offering them for sale to the DAR under CARP. He claimed DBP subsequently transferred the lands to the DAR without his consent. Separately, Colarina filed his own complaint (SCC No. 4242) concerning different lands. The two cases, while not formally consolidated, were jointly handled by the RTC.
In SCC No. 4242, respondent GSIS filed a motion to dismiss against Colarina for failure to state a cause of action, arguing he was not the owner of the lands. The RTC directed only Colarina to comment. After a hearing where most parties were absent, the RTC issued a single Order dismissing both SCC No. 4242 and SCC No. 4243. It ruled that Colarina had no cause of action and, sua sponte, extended the same ground to dismiss Teston’s case, noting DBP had rescinded the conditional sale. The CA sustained the dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing SCC No. 4243 motu proprio on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the CA decision, and remanded SCC No. 4243 to the RTC. The Court held that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is not a jurisdictional defect but a dilatory motion that can be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. In this case, the motion to dismiss was filed solely by GSIS in SCC No. 4242 and pertained only to the claims in that case. Respondents DBP, LBP, and the DAR Secretary in SCC No. 4243 never filed any motion to dismiss or raised the ground in their answers.
Consequently, the RTC had no authority to dismiss Teston’s case (SCC No. 4243) on its own initiative based on that ground. Doing so violated Teston’s fundamental right to due process, as he was never given notice or opportunity to be heard on the specific issue of whether his complaint stated a cause of action against DBP. The Court emphasized that due process prohibits a court from dismissing a case on a waived, non-jurisdictional ground without affording the party a chance to argue against it. The merits of whether Teston’s complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action were thus left for the RTC to determine in proper proceedings upon remand.