G.R. No. 144118 ; July 21, 2004
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. WINSTON JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO, and EVELYN CORDERO, respondents.

FACTS

This case originated from a laboratory accident at Saint Louis University (SLU). During an Organic Chemistry experiment, respondent student Winston Joseph Z. Cordero was injured when chemicals burst from a test tube and hit his face and eyes, resulting in the total blindness of his right eye. The experiment proceeded despite the textbook’s recommendation for goggles, as none were available. The Regional Trial Court found petitioners SLU and its instructor, Engr. Christine Bautista, guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to Winston. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. However, their counsel, the Dean of the SLU College of Law, failed to pay the corresponding docket fees on time, attributing the delay to uncertainty about the amount and the procedure for payment due to the geographical distance between Baguio and the trial court in Isabela.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ motion to admit the belatedly paid docket fees and dismissed the appeal. Petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari, arguing that their counsel’s failure constituted gross negligence that should not bind them, as it deprived them of due process. They contended that the appellate court’s dismissal on a technicality frustrated substantial justice.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for failure to pay the docket fees on time.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that a client is generally bound by the acts, even negligent ones, of his counsel. The Court distinguished the cited precedent, Amil v. Court of Appeals, where relief was granted due to a lawyer’s abandonment of his client. Here, counsel’s actions—filing the notice of appeal and subsequently moving to admit the fees—demonstrated continued representation, not abandonment. His proffered excuses (ignorance of the fee amount and procedural uncertainty) were deemed inexcusable for a seasoned law dean and practitioner; they constituted simple, not gross, negligence. The rules on the timeliness of appeal are jurisdictional. The Court emphasized that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and that the remedy for counsel’s ordinary negligence is a separate action for malpractice, not reinstatement of the appeal. The dismissal for failure to comply with a procedural rule of mandatory character was thus upheld.