GR 142609; (November, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 142609 . November 25, 2004
SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC. AND CICERO L. MALUNDA, petitioners, vs. LUCIO A. BUL-AN, JR., respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Lucio Bul-an, Jr. was hired by petitioner Seastar Marine Services as an Able Seaman. On June 16, 1995, while aboard the M/V Blue Topaz, he was mauled by the Chief Mate. He reported the incident to the ship’s Master, Captain Jacobus. Instead of addressing the complaint, Captain Jacobus wrote a letter alleging Bul-an was uncooperative and refused orders. On June 26, after another alleged maltreatment, Bul-an left the vessel. He returned days later with a priest and a lawyer, but the Captain refused to accept him back. Bul-an was forced to seek embassy assistance and repatriate to the Philippines.
Bul-an filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioners contended his dismissal was for a just cause, alleging he was “psychologically ill,” disobedient, uncooperative, and had abandoned ship. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Bul-an, finding the dismissal illegal. The NLRC reversed, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Bul-an filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed it for being filed out of time, counting the reglementary period from his receipt of the NLRC Resolution, not from receipt of the subsequent Entry of Judgment.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of prescription.
RULING
No, the CA did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal. The period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The law is clear and does not make a distinction. The period is reckoned from the party’s receipt of the assailed NLRC resolution or decision, not from the receipt of the entry of judgment.
In this case, Bul-an received the NLRC Resolution on October 8, 1998. He thus had until December 7, 1998, to file his petition. He filed it only on December 14, 1998, which was seven days late. His argument that the period should be counted from his receipt of the Entry of Judgment on November 10, 1998, is without merit. An entry of judgment is merely a ministerial notice that the decision has become final and executory; it does not restart the period for filing an appeal or a special civil action. The reglementary period is fixed and inextendible to prevent undue delay. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with the law.