G.R. No. 142534 ; June 27, 2006
DONATO SUMAWAY, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. URBAN BANK, INC., ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a civil action for Reformation of Contract and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The RTC granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated September 12, 1995. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order dated January 30, 1996. Petitioners’ counsel received this denial on April 25, 1996. On May 3, 1996, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved. The appeal was docketed with the Court of Appeals (CA), where petitioners paid docket fees and filed their appellants’ brief.
Subsequently, respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, contending it was filed out of time. The CA agreed, finding that the notice was filed five days late, as the 15-day appeal period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration expired on April 28, 1996. The CA dismissed the appeal and denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time.
RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED the CA Resolutions, and ordered the remand of the case to the CA for further proceedings. The Court applied the new procedural rule established in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, which was promulgated after the CA’s dismissal but before this final review. The Neypes doctrine provides a fresh 15-day period to appeal, counted from the receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Applying this retroactively, petitioners’ appeal was timely. They received the order denying their motion for reconsideration on April 25, 1996. Under Neypes, they had a fresh 15-day period, or until May 10, 1996, to file their notice of appeal. Their filing on May 3, 1996, was therefore within the reglementary period. The Court emphasized that procedural rules aimed at securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action should be liberally construed. The dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon, especially where a relaxation of the rules would serve the demands of substantial justice and prevent the denial of a party’s right to appeal. Consequently, the CA’s dismissal was set aside.