G.R. No. 142456; July 27, 2004
DR. DEMETRIO BEROÑA, M.D., DR. ROMULO GAERLAN, M.D., AURIE VIADO-ADRIANO and VIDA LABIOS, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, former public officers and employees of the Provincial Health Office of Bangued, Abra, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Information alleged they conspired to release public funds to an individual not the legitimate labor contractor, causing undue injury to the project laborers. Upon arraignment where they pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for their suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan, after a pre-suspension hearing, issued a Resolution suspending petitioners from office for ninety (90) days. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that at the time of the suspension order, they were no longer occupying the specific positions they held when the alleged offense was committed. Dr. Beroña had become Municipal Mayor, Dr. Gaerlan had resigned and later re-joined government in a different capacity, Viado-Adriano was with the Land Bank, and Labios was an accounting clerk for the Provincial Government. Their motion was denied, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which mandates the suspension of an “incumbent public officer” pending trial, applies to petitioners who were no longer in the same positions they occupied at the time of the alleged offense.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions. The Court held that Section 13 is clear and mandatory: it applies to any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for offenses under the Act is pending. The term “incumbent” refers to the officer’s current holding of any public office at the time the suspension order is issued, not exclusively the office involved in the charge. Since petitioners were occupying other government positions when suspended, the law applied to them.
The legal logic is grounded on the dual purpose of preventive suspension: to prevent the accused from using their office to intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence, or commit further malfeasance during trial. This preventive measure is not a penalty but a preliminary step to ensure a fair and unhampered trial. The Court reiterated established jurisprudence that the requirement of incumbency is satisfied if the accused holds any public office, regardless of whether it is the same office involved in the information. The 90-day suspension period was also deemed proper and in accord with precedent. Petitioners’ claim of weak prosecution evidence was irrelevant, as the determination of guilt is evidentiary and reserved for trial on the merits, not the pre-suspension hearing.