GR 142023; (June, 2001) (Digest)
G.R. No. 142023. June 21, 2001
SANNY B. GINETE, petitioner, vs. SUNRISE MANNING AGENCY, SUMMER WIND SHIPPING CO./TRUST CARRIER S.A. & NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Sanny B. Ginete filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of wages against respondents. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but awarded damages for due process violation. The NLRC affirmed this decision on appeal. Petitioner received the NLRC decision on March 16, 1999, and filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 25, 1999. The NLRC denied the motion via a Resolution dated April 27, 1999. Petitioner’s counsel received a copy of this denial resolution on June 21, 1999, while petitioner himself received his copy on July 22, 1999. On September 10, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted a 15-day extension until September 26, 1999. The petition was filed on September 27, 1999. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being filed 30 days late, counting the 60-day reglementary period from June 21, 1999 (counsel’s receipt), not July 22, 1999 (petitioner’s receipt).
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as filed out of time by counting the 60-day reglementary period from the date petitioner’s counsel received the assailed NLRC Resolution, rather than from the date petitioner himself received it.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The petition was correctly dismissed for being filed out of time. The period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from an NLRC decision is governed by the Rules of Court, not by Article 224 of the Labor Code. Article 224, which requires separate furnishing of copies to counsel and party, applies specifically to the execution of final decisions, orders, or awards, not to the computation of appeal periods. For the purpose of computing the period to appeal or file a certiorari petition, the established rule is that notice to counsel is notice to the party. This is supported by Section 4, Rule III of the NLRC Rules, which states that for computing appeal periods, receipt by the counsel of record is counted. This principle applies by analogy to petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Since petitioner’s counsel received the NLRC Resolution on June 21, 1999, the 60-day period to file the petition expired on August 20, 1999. The petition filed on September 27, 1999, was therefore late. The contention of denial of due process is without merit, as petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to be heard through the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the motion for reconsideration; due process does not override the mandatory observance of procedural rules for appeals.
