G.R. No. 141986; July 11, 2002
NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.

FACTS

The Regional Trial Court promulgated its judgment acquitting the accused of estafa on October 29, 1999. The private prosecutor, representing petitioner Neplum, Inc. as the private offended party, was present at the promulgation. Petitioner received its copy of the written judgment on November 12, 1999. On November 29, 1999, it filed a motion for reconsideration directed at the civil aspect of the judgment. The trial court denied this motion on January 24, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2000, seeking to appeal the civil liability aspect.
The trial court denied due course to the Notice of Appeal. It ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, which it computed from the date of the judgment’s promulgation on October 29, 1999. Petitioner contended that the period should instead be reckoned from its actual receipt of a copy of the written decision on November 12, 1999, which would make its appeal timely.

ISSUE

Whether the 15-day period for a private offended party to appeal the civil aspect of a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt should be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision or from the date the offended party receives a copy thereof.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The reglementary period to appeal the civil aspect of a criminal judgment is counted from the time the private offended party has actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment. In this case, the private prosecutor was present at the promulgation of the acquittal on October 29, 1999. This presence constituted constructive, if not actual, notice of the court’s decision, including its civil aspects. Therefore, the 15-day period to appeal began to run from that date of promulgation.
The Court clarified that while the offended party is entitled to a copy of the judgment, the reckoning point for the appeal period is knowledge, not receipt of a formal copy. The presence of counsel at promulgation serves as adequate notice. Since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was filed on November 29, 1999, which was already beyond 15 days from October 29, the judgment had become final. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the subsequent Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. The Court also noted that petitioner utilized the wrong mode of review by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, which was the proper remedy to assail an order disallowing an appeal.