GR 141964; (June, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 141964 ; June 30, 2006
SPOUSES EDESITO and CONSORCIA RAGASA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GERARDO and RODRIGA ROA and the EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Spouses Ragasa purchased a property in 1989, fully paid for it by 1992, and received a Deed of Absolute Sale and the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. They took immediate possession and resided there continuously. However, the vendor corporation failed to effect the transfer of the title. In 1999, petitioners discovered that the property had been sold at an execution sale by the respondent sheriff to respondent Spouses Roa in 1995, without any notice to them as occupants.
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the execution sale and damages. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of prescription and laches. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion, ruling that the action was based on an injury to petitioners’ rights under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, which prescribes in four years. Since the complaint was filed in 1999, more than four years after the 1995 execution sale, the RTC held it was barred by prescription.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. The legal logic is that the trial court erroneously characterized the nature of petitioners’ action. A proper reading of the allegations in the complaint reveals it is essentially an action for quieting of title under Article 476 of the Civil Code. The complaint alleged that petitioners had acquired ownership and possession of the property through sale and delivery, and that the respondents’ claim arose from an execution sale that was allegedly void due to lack of notice and gross inadequacy of price. These allegations sufficiently constitute an action to quiet title, which seeks to remove a cloud on title created by an instrument that is apparently valid but actually invalid.
Crucially, the Court held that an action to quiet title is imprescriptible when the plaintiff is in possession of the property. The complaint expressly alleged that petitioners were in continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession in the concept of owners since 1989—an allegation respondents did not dispute. Applying the doctrine in Sapto v. Fabiana, which adopts the principle that actions to quiet title for property in the plaintiff’s possession do not prescribe, the Court ruled petitioners’ right to seek judicial relief remained intact. They could wait until their title was attacked before acting. Therefore, the defense of prescription was unavailable, and the case must be remanded for trial on the merits.