G.R. No. 141668; August 20, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONTEMPT ORDERS AGAINST LT. GEN. JOSE M. CALIMLIM AND ATTY. DOMINGO A. DOCTOR, JR.

FACTS

This case originated from the failure to produce an accused, Leonardo Pitao, for his scheduled arraignment on November 19, 1999, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Pitao had been arrested and, for security reasons, was detained at the ISAFP Detention Cell in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. The ISAFP, through its Chief, Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim, and its Legal Action Unit Chief, Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr., had earlier secured a Commitment Order from Judge Adoracion Cruz-Avisado, promising to produce Pitao for all court hearings. When Pitao was not brought to court on the arraignment date, the judge ordered the petitioners to explain their failure in writing.
In their compliance, petitioners explained that due to security threats, they had filed a Petition for Change of Venue to Quezon City and a motion to defer proceedings pending its resolution. Unsatisfied, Judge Cruz-Avisado issued an Order on December 11, 1999, admonishing Calimlim and reprimanding Doctor for disregarding their commitment and showing “unwarranted display of arrogance.” The order directed that copies be placed in their personnel records and furnished to superior authorities. Upon motion for reconsideration, the judge, in an Order dated January 20, 2000, accepted their apology for the November 19 incident as satisfactory compliance but maintained that the admonition and reprimand would stay as part of their records.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the trial judge correctly imposed the penalties of admonition and reprimand against the petitioners for indirect contempt without following the proper procedural requirements under the Rules of Court.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition was partly meritorious. It set aside the contempt orders insofar as they imposed the penalty of reprimand on Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr.
The Court emphasized that the power to punish for indirect contempt must be exercised with strict adherence to the procedure outlined in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. This procedure mandates: (1) a written charge formally alleging the acts constituting contempt; (2) an opportunity for the respondent to comment on the charge; (3) a hearing where the court investigates the charge and considers the respondent’s defense; and (4) the imposition of punishment only after a finding of guilt. In this case, the judge’s initial November 19, 1999, Order merely directed petitioners to explain their failure to produce the accused. It did not constitute a formal written charge for indirect contempt. Consequently, the subsequent orders imposing penalties were issued without the requisite procedural foundation. The Court held that while judges have the inherent power to cite for contempt, this power must be used sparingly, with due regard for constitutional rights and statutory procedure. The failure to initiate proceedings with a proper written charge rendered the imposed penalties legally infirm.