GR L 29038; (December, 1982) (Digest)
March 15, 2026GR 194104; (March, 2013) (Digest)
March 15, 2026G.R. No. 140942; October 18, 2000
BENIGNO M. SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. JORGE Z. ORTOLL, respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Jorge Ortoll owned a condominium unit. In December 1992, he and petitioner Benigno Salvador entered into an option to purchase agreement, granting Salvador a six-month option to buy the property for P6.4 million, with a P200,000 option fee. Salvador occupied the unit. He failed to exercise the option within the period. Ortoll filed an ejectment case, which, after appeals, resulted in a Court of Appeals decision ordering Salvador to vacate and pay P500,000 in liquidated damages. Salvador appealed this to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 122164).
Pending that appeal, Salvador filed a new complaint for specific performance. To settle all disputes, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement approved by the RTC on June 28, 1996. Under its terms, Salvador would buy the property for P11.3 million, payable in two installments: 50% on or before September 26, 1996, and the balance on or before October 26, 1996. The agreement also stipulated the parties would file a joint motion to withdraw the pending Supreme Court case.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly granted the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Compromise Agreement despite petitioner Salvador’s alleged delay in payment.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reinstated the RTC order for the writ of execution. A judicial compromise agreement, once approved by the court, has the force and effect of a final and executory judgment. It is immediately enforceable and not appealable, except on grounds of fraud, mistake, or duress, which were not present here. The records showed that while Salvador’s first payment was tendered two days after the September 26 deadline, Ortoll, through his representatives, continued communicating about the sale and even sent a letter on October 16, 1996, agreeing to proceed after full payment. This conduct indicated Ortoll had not rescinded the agreement but was insisting on its performance, albeit with a new demand for additional interest not found in the compromise. The core obligation under the approved agreement was the sale of the property. Ortoll’s attempt to unilaterally alter the terms by imposing new conditions constituted a violation of the settled agreement. The greater interest of ending litigation, which the compromise served, must be upheld. Therefore, the RTC correctly ordered its execution.
