G.R. No. 140799; September 10, 2002
TOMAS T. TEODORO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

On July 13, 1959, PAMI Development Corporation registered mining claims over 185.8611 hectares in Norzagaray, Bulacan, and was later issued Mining Lease Contracts (MLC) Nos. V-202 and V-203. On January 5, 1965, PAMI sold these claims to respondent Continental Cement Corporation. On April 10, 1980, Francisco and Tomas Teodoro applied for quarry permits over their property in the same area, but the Bureau of Mines denied the application due to conflict with respondent’s claims. The Teodoros then filed a petition for cancellation of respondent’s MLCs for non-development, which was initially granted but later reversed on appeal by the Office of the President on January 5, 1987, reinstating the contracts.
Anticipating the expiration of its MLCs, respondent applied for renewal and, pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 82, filed an application for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Tomas Teodoro opposed, claiming a 12.88-hectare portion of the applied area was his property. The DENR Regional Executive Director dismissed the opposition, a decision affirmed by the DENR Secretary. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, which initially dismissed the appeal but later, on December 26, 1996, granted reconsideration and ordered the exclusion of Teodoro’s land from the MPSA.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1997. Respondent then filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner moved to expunge this second motion, alleging procedural defects, including that it was filed by a law office not counsel of record and that there were irregularities in its service. The Office of the President denied the second motion on September 3, 1997. Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on June 26, 1998, reversed the Office of the President’s resolutions and made permanent a temporary restraining order it had issued.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 134501), which was denied on October 12, 1998, for lack of a proper certification of non-forum shopping and late filing. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied, and the Court of Appeals decision became final and executory. Petitioner then filed the instant “Petition [To Declare As Null and Void the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45396],” arguing the Court of Appeals decision was void for lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, contending the Office of the President’s resolutions were final when the petition for review was filed and that respondent misrepresented the filing of its Second Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 45396 is a void judgment that can be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It held that the Resolutions of the Office of the President were not final and executory when respondent filed its petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period to appeal was interrupted by the filing of the Second Motion for Reconsideration. The Court ruled that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure, such as the requirement for a formal entry of appearance by counsel, are not strictly applied. It further found that the second motion was not pro forma and was filed on time. The Court also held that the allegations of extrinsic fraud were unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court emphasized that the extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is limited and cannot be used to reopen a controversy where a decision has long become final and executory. Litigation must end, and courts must guard against schemes to prolong controversies.