G.R. No. 1403 : March 19, 1904
JOSE E. ALEMANY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOHN C. SWEENEY, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
Prior to April 2, 1903, Doña Juana Moreno de Rastrollo was the guardian of the minors Leandro and Paz Gruet. On that date, the petitioners filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking her removal and the appointment of Doña Andrea Atayde as guardian of the persons and Jose E. Alemany as administrator of the property of the minors. On April 7, the court granted the petition and made the appointments, with Alemany posting a bond. However, on April 17, the respondent judge issued an order annulling these appointments. The petitioners attempted to appeal this order, but the judge refused to allow the appeal. Subsequently, the judge issued another order ratifying the annulment and confirming the appointment of Carlos Rastrollo as guardian. The petitioners claimed they learned of this second order in early June and appealed it on June 10, but the judge again refused to allow the appeal. The petitioners then filed a complaint in the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to allow their appeals from both orders.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to allow their appeals from the orders dated April 17, 1903, and the subsequent order confirming the appointment of Carlos Rastrollo.

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in part. It held that the petitioners were entitled to appeal the order of April 17, 1903, annulling their appointments as guardians, as they had timely filed a notice of appeal and presented the required bond. The Court rejected the respondent’s belated claim that no bond was filed, noting that a certified copy of the bond was on record and the judge’s original denial was based on other grounds. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the second order confirming Carlos Rastrollo’s appointment. The petitioners failed to allege when that order was issued, and the law required an appeal to be taken within twenty days from the issuance of the order, not from the date of knowledge. Thus, it could not be determined that the appeal was timely. The Court emphasized that its decision did not rule on the validity of the April 17 order but merely affirmed the petitioners’ right to appeal it. The respondent judge was directed to approve the bond and allow the appeal from the April 17 order, with costs against him.