GR 139658; (June, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 139658; June 21, 2005
PO3 WILLIAM M. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD and THE DISTRICT DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
FACTS
PO3 William M. Mendoza was administratively charged with grave misconduct, including illegal arrest, mauling, and robbery, based on a complaint by Teodoro V. Conti. After summary proceedings, the PNP Regional Director found him guilty and ordered his dismissal. Mendoza appealed to the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB), which affirmed the decision. His motion for reconsideration, arguing he was denied participation in a clarificatory hearing, was denied.
Mendoza then filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging denial of due process. The RAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, arguing he should have appealed the RAB Decision to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) first. The RTC denied the motion, holding that the due process claim was an exception to the exhaustion rule. The RAB elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Mendoza’s RTC petition for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal based on two grounds: procedural default and the substantive requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Procedurally, Mendoza failed to file a comment on the RAB’s petition before the Court of Appeals and, after an adverse decision, did not file a motion for reconsideration. This omission, without explanation, indicated a frivolous appeal and disregard for procedural norms designed for speedy and orderly proceedings. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy that allows a court to correct errors or clarify its ruling, avoiding premature appellate recourse.
Substantively, Mendoza failed to exhaust the administrative hierarchy. Under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 (The DILG Act of 1990), a decision by a PNP Regional Director is appealable to the RAB, and therefrom to the DILG Secretary. As the PNP is part of the civil service, an unfavorable decision by the Secretary could be further appealed to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the Constitution and the Administrative Code. Mendoza’s direct resort to the RTC, bypassing the DILG Secretary, violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This doctrine mandates that where an administrative remedy is available, it must be resorted to first before seeking judicial intervention to allow the administrative body to correct its own errors. His claim of denial of due process did not justify an exception, as the administrative process itself provided adequate recourse. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error.