GR 139405; (March, 2001) (Digest)
G.R. No. 139405 ; March 13, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ( R.A. No. 3019 ). The Information, filed on October 27, 1988, alleged that from December 1975 to January 1976, he conspired to cause the sale of NASSCO land in Camarines Norte to Philippine Smelters Corporation for a price grossly disadvantageous to the government. After arraignment, Pacificador moved to dismiss the case on grounds of prescription and failure of the Information to charge an offense.
The Sandiganbayan initially denied the motion, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine that filing a complaint with the fiscal’s office interrupts prescription. Upon reconsideration, however, the Sandiganbayan reversed itself. It held that Act No. 3326 , not the Revised Penal Code, governs the prescription of offenses under special laws like R.A. No. 3019 . Since the alleged crime ended on January 6, 1976, and the Information was filed only on October 27, 1988—beyond the ten-year prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 —the case was dismissed. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the offense had prescribed.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal. The prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 , a special law, is governed by Act No. 3326 , as amended. Section 2 of this Act explicitly states that prescription is interrupted only by the institution of “judicial proceedings,” not by the filing of a complaint with an investigative body or the Office of the Ombudsman. This interpretation was solidified in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. (211 SCRA 277).
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code on interruption of prescription applies suppletorily. The clear and specific language of Act No. 3326 prevails. The offense, completed by January 6, 1976, prescribed ten years later on January 6, 1986. The judicial proceeding—the filing of the Information on October 27, 1988—occurred after this date. Therefore, the crime had already prescribed. The Court found no merit in the claim that the respondent concealed the act to prevent its discovery, as the deed of sale was a public document registered with the Registry of Deeds. The petition was denied.