G.R. No. 139141-42; November 15, 2000
MAMBURAO, INC. and PETER H. MESSER, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RODOLFO D. ABELLA, LYDIA P. FERNANDEZ and NANNY P. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Mamburao, Inc. and Peter H. Messer applied for a loan with Landbank’s Balagtas Branch, which was later reduced and eventually withdrawn after a confrontation with branch manager Rodolfo Abella. They subsequently reapplied at the Landbank Baliuag Branch, where they were initially advised a higher loan amount was possible. However, their application was later “rolled back” to the Provincial Lending Center headed by Nanny P. Garcia and was formally denied. Petitioners filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for slander, libel, falsification, use of falsified documents, and perjury against the bank officers, alleging malicious statements and fabricated documents led to the loan denial. The cases were later consolidated and elevated to the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman dismissed all charges. For slander, it found Garcia’s denial credible and noted inconsistencies in the witnesses’ affidavits. For libel, it ruled the denial letter was a privileged communication, contained no malicious imputations, and was sent via registered mail. For falsification, it noted Garcia admitted submitting the contested letter, negating any fabrication. For perjury, it found no willful and deliberate falsehoods in the counter-affidavits of the respondents. It also found no evidence of manifest partiality or bad faith under the Anti-Graft Law.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints against the private respondents.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court upheld the Ombudsman’s dismissal, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed based on the evidence, and its findings are generally not reviewed unless shown to be arbitrary or capricious. The Court found the Ombudsman’s conclusions were based on a careful evaluation of the evidence and applicable law.
On the specific charges, the Court agreed with the Ombudsman’s reasoning. The slander charge lacked sufficient proof, the libelous letter was a privileged communication, the falsification charge was defeated by an admission, and the perjury allegations did not constitute willful false statements. Regarding the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019), the Court concurred that there was no showing that the respondents acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, or that their actions caused undue injury to the petitioners. The denial of a loan application, by itself, does not constitute a criminal act absent clear evidence of corrupt intent or gross negligence. The petition was dismissed.