G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999.
MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.

FACTS

On May 7, 1998, petitioner Alvin B. Garcia, as Mayor of Cebu City, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt, covering the period 1998-2001, with the first delivery scheduled for September 1998. In March 1999, news reports about the alleged anomalous purchase prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry. After investigation, the inquiry was upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and other city officials. On June 25, 1999, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against petitioner, placing him under suspension without pay for the maximum period of six months. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on July 5, 1999. Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the suspension order. The Supreme Court issued a status quo order on July 19, 1999.

ISSUE

1. Whether the reelection of petitioner to the same office condoned the alleged misconduct committed during his previous term, thereby depriving the Ombudsman of jurisdiction over the administrative case.
2. Assuming the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, whether the procedure for preventive suspension under the Local Government Code or the Ombudsman Law should apply, and whether the proper procedure was observed.
3. Assuming the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, whether the preventive suspension was based on “strong evidence” as required by law.

RULING

1. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of condonation by reelection applies. The act complained of—the signing of the contract—was performed during petitioner’s previous term. The fact that the contract period was to commence during his subsequent term does not alter the nature of the act as one committed during the prior term. Following the rulings in Aguinaldo v. Santos and Salalima v. Guingona, the Court held that the petitioner’s reelection operated as a condonation by the electorate of his prior misconduct, rendering the administrative case moot and academic. The Ombudsman therefore acted without jurisdiction in pursuing the administrative case.
2. On the second issue, the Court found it unnecessary to rule definitively on whether the Local Government Code or the Ombudsman Law governs the procedure for preventive suspension, given its disposition on the first issue. However, the Court noted the apparent conflict between the two laws regarding the maximum period of suspension (60 days under the Local Government Code versus 6 months under the Ombudsman Law) and the timing of suspension (after issues are joined under the Local Government Code). The Court suggested that the specific provisions of the Local Government Code, as the later and more specific law, might prevail over the general provisions of the Ombudsman Act concerning local elective officials.
3. On the third issue, the Court also found it unnecessary to rule, given its primary holding on condonation. Nonetheless, the Court observed that the evidence presented—primarily consisting of a hearsay affidavit and newspaper reports—appeared insufficient to meet the “strong evidence” standard required for preventive suspension.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension order dated June 25, 1999, is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby LIFTED immediately.