GR 138490; (November, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004
DESIREE L. PAGE-TENORIO, petitioner, vs. WILFREDO C. TENORIO and PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 158, PASIG CITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Desiree L. Page-Tenorio filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage. After presenting her witnesses, she filed a formal offer of evidence, furnishing a copy only to the private respondent. The trial court denied the formal offer because petitioner failed to furnish copies to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor, as explicitly required by its prior order, Article 48 of the Family Code, and the guidelines in Republic v. Molina. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which apologized for the oversight and attached belated proof of service, was also denied.
Subsequently, the trial court issued an order dismissing the entire case for nullity of marriage. The dismissal was based on two grounds: the denial of petitioner’s formal offer of exhibits and a finding that her other evidence was insufficient to prove psychological incapacity under Article 36. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, arguing that her belated service constituted substantial compliance and that no prejudice was caused.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari to nullify the trial court’s orders denying the formal offer of evidence.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition. First, the petition was an improper direct recourse. As a court of last resort, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should not be exercised where adequate relief was available from lower courts. Petitioner should have initially filed the petition with the Court of Appeals, which shares concurrent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Its order explicitly directed service to the OSG and City Prosecutor, which are mandatory in nullity cases to enable the State to intervene. Failure to comply was not a mere technicality but a disregard of a clear order and substantive rules safeguarding marriage.
Finally, the petition was rendered moot and academic by the trial court’s final order dismissing the entire case. That dismissal order, which the petitioner never appealed or questioned, attained finality. Consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction, and the case could no longer be revived. The only remedy for petitioner was to institute a new action. The denial of the formal offer was merely an interlocutory incident overtaken by the final dismissal on the merits.