GR 137619; (February, 2001) (Digest)
G.R. No. 137619 February 6, 2001
REYNALDO L. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. BORMAHECO, INC. and EDGARDO C. CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Laureano obtained credit accommodations from the Philippine National Cooperative Bank (PNCB), secured by a real estate mortgage on two lots in Makati. Upon default, PNCB extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the lots at the auction sale in 1984, and, after the redemption period, consolidated ownership. In 1988, PNCB sold the lots to Bormaheco, Inc., which then filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Reynaldo Laureano filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC denied. This denial was upheld by the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87813.
During the pendency of the ex parte proceeding, Laureano Investment and Development Corporation (LIDECO) moved to intervene, claiming ownership of buildings on the lots. The RTC initially admitted but later struck off the complaint. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 100468, ultimately denied LIDECO’s petition. Meanwhile, on October 24, 1991, the RTC granted Bormaheco’s ex parte petition for a writ of possession. Laureano then filed an “Urgent Motion to Dismiss Petition and To Strike Pleadings” on the ground of Bormaheco’s alleged lack of legal capacity. The RTC held this motion in abeyance pending G.R. No. 100468. After that case was resolved, the RTC issued an Order on September 25, 1997, directing the issuance of the writ.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the RTC’s orders and in not finding a violation of due process for issuing the writ of possession while Laureano’s pending motion to dismiss remained unresolved?
RULING
No. The Court of Appeals committed no error. The issuance of the writ of possession was proper and did not violate due process. Upon consolidation of title after an extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the purchaser (or its successor-in-interest) is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. This is a ministerial duty of the court under Act No. 3135. The proceeding is ex parte and summary in nature; it is not an action where the merits of the foreclosure are litigated. The right to possession follows from the right of ownership.
Laureano’s pending “Urgent Motion to Dismiss” did not preclude the RTC from granting the writ. The motion raised the issue of Bormaheco’s legal capacity, which the Supreme Court had already implicitly resolved in the prior related case, G.R. No. 87813, by sustaining the lower courts’ rulings that upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction and proceedings. Furthermore, the core issue in an ex parte petition for a writ of possession is merely the ministerial issuance of the writ based on consolidated title. Laureano was not denied a hearing; the nature of the proceeding itself is summary, and his substantive defenses, if any, pertaining to the validity of the foreclosure should have been raised in a separate judicial action. The RTC’s eventual issuance of the writ after the resolution of the intervening corporation’s case was therefore correct.