GR 136757; (November, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 136757-58 November 27, 2000
CONSUELO S. BLANCO, MILAGROS V. CABUAG and ROMUALDO P. CABUAG, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Consuelo S. Blanco, Milagros V. Cabuag, and Romualdo P. Cabuag were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 141(4) of the Revised Penal Code. The charges stemmed from an anonymous complaint received by the Ombudsman in 1988 alleging malversation of funds at Mariano Marcos State University. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted a fact-finding investigation, with the case being referred back and forth between its Manila and Laoag offices, leading to a recommendation for filing charges in 1994.
A preliminary investigation was ordered in 1995. Petitioners, except Blanco who was initially unreachable, were granted multiple extensions to file counter-affidavits but ultimately failed to submit them. The Ombudsman approved a resolution for prosecution in April 1996, and Informations were filed in May 1996. Petitioners later filed motions for reinvestigation and subsequently a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Ombudsman’s inordinate delay of over eight years in concluding the preliminary investigation violated their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash, which was grounded on an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases due to inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic rests on the distinction between the period of fact-finding investigation and the period of preliminary investigation proper for determining inordinate delay. The Court emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of cases is not violated by delays in a purely fact-finding stage conducted by the NBI, as this precedes the initiation of a formal preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman.
The Court calculated the period of preliminary investigation from the Ombudsman’s order directing it on March 20, 1995, to the filing of the Informations on May 2, 1996—a span of only about one year and two months. This period was not considered inordinate. Furthermore, any delay from 1995 to 1996 was attributable to the petitioners themselves for requesting and obtaining multiple extensions to file their counter-affidavits. The Court also declined to review the Ombudsman’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, upholding the independence of his constitutionally mandated functions. Consequently, no violation of the right to a speedy disposition was found.