G.R. No. 135786; July 23, 2004
JOSE P. TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTANISLAWA PANER and HON. JUDGE LEAH S. DOMINGO, respondents.

FACTS

The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement in an ejectment case, which was approved by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) in a January 17, 1991 Decision. The agreement stipulated a one-year lease at a monthly rental of P19,000.00, effective upon signing, and required petitioner Jose Tambunting to pay P22,000.00 in additional past rentals within one year. A key provision stated that execution would issue upon the defendant’s violation of the agreement. After the one-year period, respondent Estanislawa Paner filed a motion for execution, and the MTC issued a Writ of Execution on April 7, 1992, solely ordering Tambunting to vacate the premises. This writ was enforced, and Tambunting vacated by March 9, 1993.
Subsequently, Paner filed a Motion for Alias Writ of Execution with the MTC, claiming unpaid rentals from January 18, 1992, to March 9, 1993, totaling P259,033.00. The MTC granted the motion. Tambunting contested this, arguing the alias writ modified the judgment based on the compromise agreement, which only covered a one-year term ending January 16, 1992. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the MTC’s order, with the CA modifying the computation period to end on February 15, 1993.

ISSUE

Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the alias writ of execution for the collection of back rentals accruing after the one-year period stipulated in the judicially approved Compromise Agreement.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the assailed issuances. The Court held that the alias writ of execution was a patent nullity as it sought to enforce obligations not included in the original judgment based on the compromise agreement. The legal logic is anchored on the final and executory nature of a judgment based on a compromise, which has the force of res judicata and can only be executed for what was expressly adjudicated. The Compromise Agreement, as incorporated in the MTC Decision, was limited to a one-year lease ending January 16, 1992, and the payment of a specific sum for past rentals. The original Writ of Execution of April 7, 1992, correctly implemented only the ejectment aspect.
Consequently, claims for unpaid rentals for periods beyond the agreed one-year term, and for damages arising from holding over, constitute separate causes of action that must be pursued in a new and proper complaint, not through an alias writ of execution in the concluded ejectment case. The MTC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the alias writ, as it effectively altered the final judgment. The RTC and CA erred in affirming a void order. The proper recourse for the respondent is to file an independent action for damages.