G.R. Nos. 135688-89; October 18, 2007
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., Petitioner, vs. UEM-MARA PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TOLL REGULATORY BOARD and PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., a taxpayer and resident of Cavite, filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, and declaration of nullity of the Toll Operation Agreement (TOA) concerning the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). He alleged the TOA’s prescribed toll fees were exorbitant and were implemented without the requisite notice and public hearing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the collection of tolls. Respondents challenged this order before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA set aside the RTC’s writ of preliminary injunction. It ruled that the issuance contravened Presidential Decree No. 1818, which prohibits courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects. The CA also found that petitioner failed to prove a clear legal right justifying the injunction. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that the RTC’s issuance of the preliminary injunction was a grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the clear application of Presidential Decree No. 1818. This law explicitly withdraws the jurisdiction of courts to issue restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in any case involving an infrastructure project of the government. The MCTEP, being a public toll expressway project, is unequivocally a government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC had no authority to issue the injunctive writ against its implementation and toll collection.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right warranting the extraordinary relief of injunction. His allegations of exorbitant toll rates and lack of public hearing pertain to the merits of the main case for nullity of the TOA. For a preliminary injunction, the right must be present and vested. The Court emphasized that a preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy, not to determine controverted rights. The petitioner’s claimed interest as a taxpayer and tollway user, without a demonstrated clear legal right, was insufficient to justify the injunction. The CA correctly found no compelling reason to sustain the RTC’s order.