GR 135687; (July, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 135687; July 24, 2007
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by PCGG, Petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO, et al., Respondents.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, through the PCGG, filed three consolidated complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman against various government officials and private individuals. The complaints alleged that the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB), through their officers, extended “behest loans” to three corporations—P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation, Golden River Mining Corporation, and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation—in violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law). The Committee asserted these loans were granted despite insufficient collateral and the borrowers’ inadequate capital, constituting grossly disadvantageous transactions to the government.
The Ombudsman dismissed all complaints in an Order dated July 6, 1998, which was affirmed upon motion for reconsideration. The Ombudsman ruled that, except for two specific loan transactions of Golden River Mining Corporation in 1982, all other loan accommodations were granted beyond the ten-year prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman found the complaints barred by prescription, leading to the instant petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaints on the ground of prescription.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the proper computation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019. The Court reiterated that under Section 11 of the law, prescription commences from the “day of the commission of the violation,” which is when the accused public officer has performed the last act constituting the offense. For behest loans, the violation is deemed committed upon the final grant or release of the loan, not from the date of the loan application or board approval. The Ombudsman erroneously computed the period from the dates of the loan applications or approvals.
The Court held that the Ombudsman’s dismissal based on an incorrect starting point for prescription was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Ombudsman’s Orders and directed the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a proper evaluation of the complaints to determine the correct dates of the alleged violations and whether the actions had indeed prescribed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.