GR 135350; (March, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 135350 ; March 3, 2006
THE PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by FELIX M. DE GUZMAN, et al., Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ANIANO DESIERTO, ANICETO EVANGELISTA, JULIO V. MACUJA, ANOS FONACIER and MARIANO ZAMORA, Respondents.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) was created to investigate and inventory behest loans, defined as loans granted under questionable terms favoring cronies. The Committee investigated a loan transaction involving Bayview Plaza Hotel, Inc. (BPHI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). It found the loan to be undercollateralized and the borrower undercapitalized, characteristics of a behest loan. Specifically, DBP foreclosed on a property for P16.160 million but later dropped a P9.6 million deficiency claim against the borrower’s heirs. Furthermore, a P11 million obligation reduction for a related corporation was approved via a marginal note by then-President Ferdinand Marcos. Based on these findings, the Committee filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) against several respondents, including DBP officials and corporate officers, before the Office of the Ombudsman in 1997.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint on the ground of prescription.
RULING
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The applicable prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 is fifteen years under Act No. 3326. The Court clarified that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, not from its discovery. The questioned acts—the approval of the loan accommodations and the reduction of the obligation—occurred in 1967 and 1977, respectively. The criminal complaint was filed only in 1997, which is beyond the fifteen-year prescriptive period from either date. The Court rejected the Committee’s argument that prescription should commence from the discovery of the crime in 1992, as the law expressly states the period runs from the commission of the offense. The Ombudsman’s finding of prescription was based on a correct application of the law and involved an exercise of judgment well within its constitutional mandate and discretion; thus, it cannot be overturned via a petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of grave abuse, which was not present.