G.R. No. 135249; January 16, 2004
ATTY. ORLANDO SALVADOR for and in behalf of the PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, Petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, as Ombudsman, RAFAEL A. SISON, CESAR ZALAMEA, ALICIA Ll. REYES, ARISTON S. MARTINEZ, in their capacity as officials of the Development Bank of the Philippines, and JOSE O. COBARRUBIAS, ARMANDO V. LIM, CANDIDO P. SORIENTE, FRANCISCO G. GREGORIO, JUAN A. SISON, and ROLANDO LORENTE, Directors/Officers of Hotel Mirador, Inc., Respondents.

FACTS

From 1975 to 1977, Hotel Mirador, Inc. obtained three loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) totaling P95 million for hotel construction. In 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos created the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to inventory and investigate loans granted under questionable terms during the Marcos administration. Applying the criteria in Memorandum Order No. 61, the Committee, through petitioner Atty. Orlando Salvador, found the Hotel Mirador loans to be behest loans, being allegedly under-collateralized and granted to an undercapitalized corporation.
Consequently, on September 18, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the directors/officers of Hotel Mirador and the approving DBP officials for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Ombudsman, in a Resolution dated April 27, 1998, dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove the loans were behest, noting Hotel Mirador had sufficient collateral valued at P92,025,100.00. It also held that the offense had prescribed, as the latest loan transaction occurred on April 22, 1977, beyond the 15-year prescriptive period under Act No. 3326. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence and prescription of the offense?

RULING

No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court affirmed the dismissal. On the issue of prescription, the Court clarified that violations of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, prescribe in 15 years pursuant to Act No. 3326. The prescriptive period commenced from the date of the commission of the offense, which was the date of the latest loan transaction on April 22, 1977. The complaint filed in 1996 was thus filed beyond the 15-year period. The Court rejected the argument that the creation of the Fact-Finding Committee in 1992 was the point of discovery, as the prescriptive law does not make discovery the starting point. The constitutional provision on the imprescriptibility of the right to recover ill-gotten wealth applies to civil recovery, not to the prosecution of criminal actions.
On the merits, the Court found no grave abuse in the Ombudsman’s finding of insufficient evidence. The Court defers to the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial discretion, interfering only upon a clear showing of grave abuse. The records, including DBP memoranda, showed the loans underwent intensive study and were approved by the DBP Board exercising sound business judgment. Petitioner failed to substantiate allegations of criminal design, collusion, or