GR 135119; (October, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 135119; October 21, 2004
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (Represented by DANILO R.V. DANIEL), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ALICIA Ll. REYES, DON M. FERRY, PLACIDO MAPA, MR. AND MRS. PEDRO GARCIA, SR., and SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., respondents.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans, chaired by the PCGG, investigated loan transactions between Selectra Electronics Corporation (SELEC) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee found that between 1976 and 1980, SELEC, through its officers (private respondents Garcia spouses and Santiago Dumlao, Jr.), obtained substantial foreign currency and peso loans approved by the DBP Board (public respondents Reyes, Ferry, and Mapa). The Committee concluded these were behest loans, characterized by SELEC’s insufficient capital and collateral and the project’s non-feasibility.
Consequently, on September 15, 1997, the Committee filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, ruling that the ten-year prescriptive period (as it was then) commenced from the commission of the offenses between 1976 and 1980. The complaint filed in 1997 was thus filed beyond the prescriptive period.
ISSUE
Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the offense had prescribed?
RULING
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The applicable law governing the prescription of offenses under R.A. No. 3019 is Act No. 3326, as amended, not the Revised Penal Code. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 explicitly provides that the prescriptive period shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation. The Court, citing the precedent in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, held that this rule applies squarely to cases involving alleged behest loans.
The petitioner’s argument that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (which states prescription runs from discovery) should apply suppletorily was rejected. The Court clarified that where a special law like Act No. 3326 specifically provides for the commencement of the prescriptive period, that specific provision controls. Since the loan transactions, which were the basis of the alleged violations, occurred from 1976 to 1980 and were matters of public record, the prescriptive period commenced at that time. The filing of the complaint in 1997 was indisputably beyond the then applicable ten-year prescriptive period. The Ombudsman’s adherence to this clear legal rule was correct and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.