G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005
NICANOR T. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Nicanor Santos and respondent Consuelo Santos-Guerrero are siblings who, along with other heirs, executed a “Deed of Partition” in 1959 concerning inherited properties. This deed obligated Nicanor to pay Consuelo a specified sum. Consuelo and her husband filed multiple suits to enforce this obligation. A 1960 decision by Judge Andres Reyes (Exhibit “5”) ordered Nicanor to pay Consuelo P26,650. Subsequently, a 1979 decision by Judge Eutropio Migriño (Exhibit “A”) in a related but distinct case ordered Nicanor to pay P31,825 based on the same deed. The 1979 decision was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court in 1986.
Over six years after the finality of the 1979 judgment, and without having executed it, the respondents filed a complaint for revival of judgment before the RTC of Malabon-Navotas to prevent it from lapsing. Petitioner Nicanor moved to dismiss, arguing the action was barred by res judicata due to the prior 1960 decision and that it violated the rule requiring earnest efforts for compromise between family members under Article 151 of the Family Code.

ISSUE

The core issues were: (1) whether the action for revival of judgment was barred by res judicata; and (2) whether the suit was dismissible for failure to show prior earnest efforts toward a compromise among family members.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. On the first issue, res judicata did not apply. The Court found that the 1960 decision (Exhibit “5”) and the 1979 decision (Exhibit “A”) involved different causes of action. The 1960 case was for the enforcement of the partition agreement, while the 1979 case included a third-party complaint and addressed different claims for damages. The Court upheld the factual finding of the lower courts that these were separate judgments, a finding entitled to great respect. Therefore, reviving the final 1979 judgment was proper.
On the second issue, the requirement for a prior compromise under Article 151 of the Family Code was not applicable to the action for revival of judgment. The Court ruled that such an action is a continuation of the original suit for enforcement of the prior final judgment. It is not an independent, new suit initiating a cause of action between family members. Since the original 1979 case had already undergone judicial scrutiny and reached finality, the policy behind Article 151—to preserve family harmony by requiring compromise attempts before litigation—was no longer served. The revival action merely sought to give the already-adjudicated rights a fresh period for enforcement.