G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988, for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he succeeded to the office of Mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. He served the remainder of that term. On May 11, 1992, he was elected Mayor for a term ending June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for a term ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor for the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification, arguing Capco would have served three consecutive terms as mayor by June 30, 1998. The COMELEC Second Division initially disqualified Capco, but the COMELEC En Banc reversed, declaring him eligible. Capco won the election. Petitioner filed this certiorari petition to set aside the COMELEC resolution and declare private respondent disqualified.

ISSUE

Whether a Vice-Mayor who succeeds to the office of Mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.

RULING

No. The service of a term as Mayor by succession is not considered a term for which the official was elected, and therefore does not count towards the three-term limit. The constitutional and statutory provisions barring elective local officials from serving more than three consecutive terms contemplate service by election. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution states: “The term of office of elective local officials… shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” The second sentence, which prevents circumvention of the limit, explicitly refers to service “for the full term for which he was elected.” This implies the term limit applies only to terms served by election. The Court examined the intent of the Constitutional Commission, which balanced two policies: preventing the monopolization of political power and preserving the people’s freedom of choice. To count a term served by succession as one full term would unduly restrict the people’s right to choose their leaders. Since Capco was not elected to the office of Mayor in 1989 but succeeded to it by operation of law, that service is not counted. He was subsequently elected in 1992 and 1995. Therefore, he had only served two consecutive terms for which he was elected at the time of the 1998 elections and was eligible to run. The petition was dismissed.