G.R. No. 131953; June 5, 2002
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Conchita Cabatingan executed several deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. A 1992 deed covered a house and lot, while four deeds executed on January 14, 1995, covered various parcels of land. The 1995 deeds contained identical critical stipulations: the donation was made “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” and provided that “in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded.” Upon Conchita’s death in May 1995, the respondents, her other heirs, filed an action for annulment. They argued the donations were mortis causa and void for non-compliance with the formalities required for wills under the Civil Code.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings, declaring the four 1995 deeds null and void ab initio as donations mortis causa for failure to follow the solemnities prescribed under Article 806 of the Civil Code. The court declared the parties as co-owners of the properties by hereditary succession. Petitioners elevated the case, contending the donations were inter vivos, made in consideration of love and affection, and that the rescission clause was merely a resolutory condition characteristic of such donations.

ISSUE

Whether the donations executed by Conchita Cabatingan are inter vivos or mortis causa.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the trial court’s ruling that the donations are mortis causa and therefore void. The legal logic hinges on the application of established characteristics distinguishing a donation mortis causa. The Court reiterated the three-fold test: (1) title or ownership is not transferred to the donee before the donor’s death; (2) the donation is revocable by the donor at will during their lifetime; and (3) the donation is void if the donee predeceases the donor.
The Court found the decisive element in the explicit phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR.” This clause unequivocally shows Conchita Cabatingan did not intend to transfer ownership of the properties during her lifetime, thus retaining full control and naked title. This intent is corroborated by the stipulation causing automatic rescission if the donee predeceased the donor, a hallmark of a mortis causa disposition. The petitioners’ argument that the donations were motivated by love and affection is immaterial, as the stated cause does not override the clear postponement of transfer until death. Since the donations are mortis causa, they must comply with the stringent formalities for wills under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. The deeds, though notarized, were not executed with the requisite attestation and subscription by witnesses as mandated for wills. Consequently, for failure to observe these solemnities, the deeds are null and void.