GR 131483; (October, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 131483. October 26, 1999
Tai Lim, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FE TORRES-ARCILLA as Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
On August 8, 1995, petitioner Tai Lim was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to a charge for violation of R.A. 6425. The initial trial was set for September 7, 1995, but was subsequently reset eleven (11) times over a period extending to September 17, 1996. The reasons for the postponements included: failure to serve subpoenas on prosecution witnesses due to their office transfer; absence of proof of service of subpoenas; absence of the assigned prosecutor; unavailability of the forensic chemist due to a conflicting court appearance; reraffling of the case to another branch; petitioner being without counsel; unavailability of petitioner’s newly engaged counsel; and non-appearance of prosecution witnesses despite notification. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion and the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, thereby allegedly violating his constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the multiple postponements and delays in the proceedings.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, finding no violation of the right to a speedy trial. The Court held that not all postponements were attributable to the prosecution, as two were due to petitioner’s lack of counsel or counsel’s unavailability. The reasons for the prosecution’s postponements were deemed reasonable and not intended to delay, such as lack of proof of subpoena service, reraffling of the case, and a fire that destroyed court records—circumstances beyond the prosecution’s control. The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not preclude the State from a reasonable opportunity to prosecute, and it prohibits only vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The delays in this case were not of such character. The right is violated only by unjustified postponements that prolong the trial unreasonably; a mere mathematical reckoning of time is insufficient. The Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error.