GR 131082; (June, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 131082; June 19, 2000
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, petitioner, vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner, a law firm, was previously exempted from Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for 1995 due to its superior retirement plan under Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended. In September 1995, respondent HDMF’s Board issued amendments to its implementing rules, specifically Board Resolution No. 1011, which altered the exemption requirement. The new Rule VII, Section 1 mandated that for a waiver of coverage, a company must have a plan providing for both superior provident/retirement and housing benefits, not just one. Petitioner subsequently applied for a waiver for 1996 based on its retirement plan alone, contesting the new rule’s validity. HDMF denied the application, citing the new “and” requirement. Petitioner’s appeal was later denied as moot due to a subsequent 1996 Board Resolution (No. 1208) that removed the waiver option entirely, except for distressed employers. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s challenge, upholding the mandatory coverage and the validity of the amended rules.
ISSUE
Whether the 1995 and 1996 Amendments to the HDMF Rules and Regulations, which respectively required both superior plans for exemption and then abolished the exemption, are valid.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled the amendments invalid. The 1995 amendment requiring both a superior retirement and housing plan contravened the enabling law. Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, explicitly states that an employer with its own “provident and/or employee-housing plan” may apply for a waiver if such plan’s features are superior. The disjunctive “or” in the statute means the existence of either a superior provident plan or a superior housing plan is sufficient for exemption. An administrative rule cannot amend, alter, or expand the law it seeks to implement. By changing the statutory “or” to an “and,” HDMF imposed an additional obligation not found in the law, which is impermissible.
Furthermore, the 1996 amendment that abolished the waiver option altogether was also void. The power to repeal or abolish the exemption granted by Section 19 of the law is legislative in character. While HDMF is granted rule-making power under the law, this authority is limited to implementing the statute’s provisions. It cannot be used to revoke a substantive right granted by the law itself. Such a revocation constitutes an act of legislation beyond the agency’s delegated authority. Consequently, the Court set aside HDMF’s disapproval of petitioner’s application and ordered a refund of collected contributions.