G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.; CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners filed a sworn complaint with the Ombudsman against private respondents, members of the board of directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI), concerning alleged behest loans. The public respondent Ombudsman dismissed the complaint motu proprio on the ground of prescription. The petitioners contend that the offense was not immediately known to them. The “behest” nature of the loans was allegedly discovered with certainty only upon finding confidential marginal notes made by former President Marcos on letters from PSI requesting loan restructuring assistance, which notes were addressed to the DBP Chairman and were not for public consumption. The Ombudsman, in dismissing the case, relied on the rulings in Dinsay and People vs. Sandiganbayan, concluding that since the loan transactions were evidenced by public documents like registered mortgage contracts, there was constructive notice to the whole world and no concealment, so prescription should run from the commission of the offense.

ISSUE

Whether the public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely dismissing the sworn complaint motu proprio on the ground of prescription without first conducting a proper preliminary investigation to receive evidence on the contentious facts surrounding the discovery of the alleged offense.

RULING

Justice Puno, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, concurred with the majority that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil, not criminal, actions, and agreed that the case should be remanded for reception of evidence on prescription. He respectfully submitted that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the complaint prematurely. The determination of prescription under Act No. 3326 involves complex factual issues: when the violation was committed, whether it was known then, and if not, the time of its discovery. The “blameless ignorance” doctrine may apply, where the statute runs only upon discovery of the cause of action. The Ombudsman should have ordered an answer, a reply, and conducted hearings to gather vital facts. The ruling that the loans’ public nature made them easily discoverable was arguable, as the “behest” character could not be ascertained from the face of the mortgage contracts alone but required discovery of confidential marginal notes. The cases of Dinsay and Sandiganbayan were inapplicable as they involved fraud apparent on the face of public documents or known to officials, unlike the instant case where the offense was allegedly not immediately known. However, Justice Puno dissented from the majority’s suggested date of discovery (after the creation of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee) as arbitrary and lacking factual basis, and also disagreed with the view that prescription should start from February 1986, as these were generalizations not tailored to the specific facts of the case. He voted for remand to the Ombudsman for further reception of evidence to determine the date of commission or discovery of the crime and to rule on prescription based on the totality of the facts.