G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002.
Geoffrey F. Griffith, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, RTC Judge Edwin A. Villasor, MTC Judge Manuel D.L. Villamayor and Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued two checks to respondent Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. for rental arrearages. The voucher accompanying the checks contained a condition that they were not to be presented without prior corporate approval by May 30, 1986, but a counter-note stated that absent such approval by that date, Phelps Dodge could present them, terming this “final and irrevocable.” On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote to Phelps Dodge instructing them not to present the checks on May 30 due to a labor strike affecting company funds. Phelps Dodge, having received no further communication, presented the checks on June 2, 1986, and they were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. After a demand letter, Griffith explained the company’s continued inability to pay. Phelps Dodge subsequently foreclosed on Lincoln Gerard’s properties.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith can be held criminally liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law).

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of B.P. 22 as a malum prohibitum offense. The law’s elements are: (1) making, drawing, and issuing a check; (2) knowledge of insufficient funds at the time of issue; and (3) subsequent dishonor. The Court found all elements present. The checks were issued and dishonored. Griffith’s knowledge of insufficiency was presumed from the dishonor, a presumption he failed to rebut. His defense—that the checks were not to be presented per the voucher instruction and that the debt was extinguished by a later civil judgment declaring Phelps Dodge’s foreclosure invalid and ordering a refund—was unavailing.
The condition on the voucher did not negate the issuance of the checks for value, which was for rental arrears. The criminal liability under B.P. 22 is separate from the civil obligation. The subsequent civil case ruling, which applied the invalid auction proceeds to the debt and ordered a refund of the excess, did not extinguish the criminal liability. The offense was complete upon the issuance and dishonor of the checks. The civil settlement or resolution of the related obligation does not operate as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for a public offense like B.P. 22. The penalties imposed by the lower courts were thus sustained.