GR 129567; (December, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 129567, December 4, 1998
JOCELYN LABARO, represented by her mother, EVELYN LABARO, petitioner, vs. HON. VINCENT EDEN C. PANAY and ALFREDO AVIADOR, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jocelyn Labaro was the complainant in a rape case against private respondent Alfredo Aviador. The Amended Information alleged that the rape was committed “by reason or on the occasion of which she has become insane,” a qualifying circumstance under Republic Act No. 7659 that prescribes the death penalty. After the prosecution presented its witnesses, including the victim and a psychiatrist, the accused filed a petition for bail.
Respondent Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay granted the petition and set bail at P200,000. In his Order, the judge focused his analysis solely on the evidence for the qualifying circumstance of insanity. He concluded that the psychiatrist’s testimony regarding the victim’s psychosis was insufficient to constitute the “insanity” required by law to upgrade the penalty to death. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE
Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in granting bail by evaluating only the evidence for the qualifying circumstance, instead of the evidence of guilt for the crime of rape itself?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the orders granting bail. The Court ruled that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a petition for bail where the accused is charged with a capital offense (punishable by death, reclusion perpetua to death, or life imprisonment), the court’s duty is to conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
This determination must be based on a consideration of the evidence for the crime charged, not merely the evidence for the aggravating or qualifying circumstances. The judge erred by compartmentalizing the issue and concentrating only on whether the prosecution proved the victim’s insanity. He should have evaluated the totality of the evidence presented, including the victim’s direct testimony on the commission of rape and the corroborating medico-legal findings, to ascertain if the proof of guilt for the crime of rape was strong. By failing to do so and by pre-judging the insufficiency of a qualifying circumstance based on his own non-expert opinion, the judge acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Consequently, the grant of bail was void. The bail bond was cancelled, and the accused was ordered surrendered to the trial court.
