G.R. No. 128466. May 31, 2001.
REMEGIO P. YU, MICHAEL S. COSUE and JULIETA M. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, JUSTICES FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO and EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL (SB 1ST Division), HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEONARDO P. TAMAYO, DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROBERT E. KALLOS, PROSECUTOR HENEDINA A. PULGAR, EDDIE PATAWARAN, SUSAN P. CASARENO, LEON LICUDO, JR. AND CRIS COLOMA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the Municipal Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Treasurer of Rosales, Pangasinan, were charged before the Ombudsman with violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint alleged they conspired to make it appear that Rosales Lumber and Hardware delivered P20,000 worth of gravel and sand for the public market when no such delivery occurred. Petitioners countered that delivery was made, supported by affidavits from market vendors and municipal engineers, and that payment was received and encashed by a representative of the supplier. The OMB Investigator initially recommended dismissal, but the Ombudsman disapproved this, relying instead on an affidavit from the supplier’s owner denying any contract or delivery.
The Ombudsman subsequently filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied by both the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. They then filed this petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion by both the Ombudsman in finding probable cause and the Sandiganbayan in sustaining it and proceeding to trial.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e).

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated the well-established doctrine that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function, primarily vested in the Ombudsman. The Court’s power of judicial review in such instances is limited to checking for arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion. The mere fact that the Ombudsman chose to give more weight to the evidence presented by the complainants, including the supplier’s denial, over the evidence presented by the petitioners, does not constitute such abuse.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of facts and circumstances that would excite a reasonable belief that the person charged is guilty of the crime. The Ombudsman, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated independence, evaluated the conflicting affidavits and found sufficient basis to proceed. The Court emphasized that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion absent a clear showing of caprice, whimsicality, or patent arbitrariness. The same reasoning applies to the Sandiganbayan’s action in finding probable cause to proceed with the trial. The petition merely questioned the Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence, which is not a proper subject for certiorari.