GR 128369; (December, 1997) (Digest)
G.R. No. 128369 December 22, 1997
RODOLFO CAOILI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RUSTICO V. PANGANIBAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rodolfo Caoili was charged, along with Tony Yip, in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). Petitioner sought a review by the Secretary of Justice of the Assistant Prosecutor’s resolution finding a prima facie case against him. On August 18, 1995, the Secretary of Justice directed petitioner’s exclusion from the Information, opining there was insufficient evidence to indict him for fencing, as the allegations did not indicate he acquired the stolen machines knowing they were stolen, and the prima facie presumption of fencing from possession did not apply to him. The prosecutor filed a motion with the trial court to exclude petitioner in consonance with the Secretary’s ruling. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that once the Information was filed, the determination of guilt or innocence rested with the court, and the accused must prove his allegations as matters of defense. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to exclude petitioner. Petitioner assails this, contending the Secretary of Justice retains authority to review prosecutorial findings until the accused is arraigned, and argues that the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul has been abandoned by Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals and Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude petitioner from the criminal Information despite the Secretary of Justice’s directive to that effect, and whether the Crespo vs. Mogul doctrine on court discretion over a filed case has been abandoned.
RULING
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Crespo vs. Mogul doctrine has not been abandoned. The Court clarified that Roberts did not overturn Crespo but sustained the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of prosecutors even while a criminal case is pending, as recognized under the Rules of Court. However, the Secretary is enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining such petitions once an information is filed in court. Crucially, the grant of a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution after the Secretary reverses a resolution remains subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court reiterated the Crespo rule: once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the court’s discretion. The court is the sole judge of the case before it and is not bound by the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, whether filed before or after arraignment or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice. The appellate court correctly appreciated the prevailing Crespo-Marcelo-Roberts rule. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
