G.R. No. 128230; October 13, 2000
Rockwell Perfecto Gohu, petitioner, vs. Spouses Alberto Gohu and Adelaida Gohu, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rockwell Gohu filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondents to compel them to accept a balance and execute a deed of sale for a parcel of land based on an alleged Option to Buy. Respondents denied the claim, asserting the signatures on the document were forged. The case was originally before Branch 142 of the Makati RTC, presided by Judge Salvador De Guzman. After forensic examinations by the NBI and PC Crime Laboratory indicated forgery, Judge De Guzman granted a motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered reinstatement.
Upon remand, Judge Francisco Donato Villanueva had taken over. Petitioner filed a Motion for Disqualification against Judge Villanueva, alleging bias because a partner in the law firm representing respondents was the son-in-law of the judge’s personal counsel in an administrative case. Judge Villanueva denied the motion. During pre-trial, petitioner’s request for further signature examinations was denied as premature. After continued resets, the judge terminated pre-trial and set the case for trial. On the trial date for petitioner’s evidence, petitioner instead filed a Second Motion for Inhibition, citing the judge’s alleged prejudicial actuations. Judge Villanueva denied this motion and issued an order deeming petitioner’s case submitted for resolution without evidence.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the inhibition of Judge Villanueva on grounds of bias and prejudice.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that for a judge’s inhibition under Rule 137, Section 1, mere suspicion of partiality is insufficient; there must be clear and convincing evidence of bias or prejudice. The Court found petitioner’s allegations unsubstantiated. Judge Villanueva’s denial of the request for additional signature examinations was a proper exercise of judicial discretion, as it was deemed premature and petitioner was not precluded from seeking it during trial. The judge’s order deeming the case submitted without evidence was a reasonable response to petitioner’s deliberate delay and refusal to proceed after nearly seven years of litigation, which constituted a waiver of the right to present evidence. The Court emphasized that bias cannot be presumed against a judge’s sworn duty to administer justice impartially. Petitioner failed to present clear acts indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice, thus not meeting the required evidentiary standard for mandatory inhibition.