G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Joselito del Rosario, a tricycle driver, was charged with Robbery with Homicide alongside three others for the robbery and killing of businesswoman Virginia Bernas. The prosecution’s eyewitness, tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo, testified that he saw two men grapple with the victim for her bag. One assailant shot the victim while she was on the ground. The bag was then brought to a nearby tricycle, which Alonzo identified as being driven by del Rosario, before it sped away. Del Rosario presented a different account, claiming he was hired by co-accused “Boy” Santos for a legitimate trip. He alleged that Santos directed him to pick up two other co-accused, after which one of them robbed and shot the victim. Del Rosario testified that Santos, who remained inside the tricycle, prevented him from leaving by threatening him with a gun, forcing him to drive the perpetrators away from the crime scene.

ISSUE

Whether accused-appellant Joselito del Rosario is exempt from criminal liability under Article 12(5) of the Revised Penal Code for having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

RULING

The Supreme Court ACQUITTED Joselito del Rosario. The Court sustained his claim for exemption from criminal liability under Article 12(5) of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts one who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The legal logic is that a person acting under such compulsion does not act with freedom; the act is not considered his own. For the exemption to apply, the force must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument, acting against his will. The force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and impending, inducing a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm. The Court found that del Rosario, who was unarmed, was directly threatened with a gun by his armed co-accused during the commission of the crime. This threat was present and imminent, leaving him no reasonable opportunity to escape or defend himself. The Court held it was natural for a person in his situation to obey the armed assailant to preserve his own life. Consequently, his actions—being prevented from leaving and later driving the getaway vehicle—were done under the compulsion of an irresistible force, negating criminal liability. The trial court’s finding of conspiracy was therefore erroneous, as his participation was not voluntary.