GR 127549; (January 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 127549 January 28, 1998
SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN FAJARDO, respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo (private respondents) are the registered owners of Lot No. 124 in Obando, Bulacan. Their lot is surrounded by other properties: a fishpond (Lot 1) on the northeast, Lot 126 owned by Florentino Cruz on the southeast, properties of Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria (petitioners) on the southwest, and Lot 122 owned by the Jacinto family on the northwest. The petitioners’ properties directly abut the provincial road. The private respondents alleged they had no adequate outlet to the provincial road and that their predecessors-in-interest had been passing through the petitioners’ properties. After the petitioners refused to grant a right of way, the private respondents filed a complaint for the establishment of a compulsory easement of right of way through the petitioners’ lots. The trial court granted the easement, finding based on an ocular inspection that the private respondents’ property was completely surrounded by an adobe fence with no point of egress to the national road, and that the passage through the petitioners’ property was the shortest and least prejudicial route. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the indemnity by increasing the property valuation. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the grant of a compulsory easement of right of way in favor of the private respondents.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, are conclusive and that all requisites for a compulsory easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code were satisfied: (1) the dominant estate (private respondents’ lot) is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) the private respondents are willing to pay proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate, as the property was already surrounded when purchased; and (4) the right of way through the petitioners’ property is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and is the shortest distance to the highway. The Court rejected the petitioners’ arguments, noting that the alternative routes through the properties of Cruz or Jacinto were longer and more circuitous, and that a “daang tao” at the back of the property bordered by a fishpond was insufficient for the needs of the dominant estate. The Court also found no merit in the claim that the Court of Appeals based its facts on allegations rather than evidence.