GR 1275; (January, 1904) (Digest)
G.R. No. 1275 : January 23, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. MELENCIO TUBIG, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The appellant, Melencio Tubig, a soldier of the Eight Company of Native Scouts (Macabebes), was charged in the Court of First Instance of San Isidro with the crime of assassination for killing Antonio Alivia in Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, on November 23, 1901. At the trial, the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. It was admitted that Tubig had previously been tried for the same act by a general court-martial convened in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, in December 1901. The court-martial convicted him of “manslaughter” (a violation of the 58th Article of War) and sentenced him to dishonorable discharge and one year of imprisonment at hard labor, which sentence was approved by the reviewing authority and served by Tubig for seven months before his release. The release followed an opinion from the Judge-Advocate-General of the U.S. Army stating that the one-year sentence was illegal because it was less than the minimum penalty of twelve years and one day prescribed by the Philippine Penal Code for manslaughter, and thus the court-martial had violated the statute granting it jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, proceeded with the trial, convicted Tubig of homicide, and sentenced him to twelve years and one day of imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant was placed in jeopardy by his trial, conviction, and punishment before the general court-martial, thereby barring his subsequent prosecution in the Court of First Instance for the same offense.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and acquitted the defendant.
The Court held that the general court-martial had jurisdiction to try the accused soldier for an offense (manslaughter) under the 58th Article of War. The proceedings resulted in a valid conviction and a sentence that was approved and executed. The subsequent opinion of the Judge-Advocate-General declaring the sentence illegal did not nullify the final judgment that had already been communicated to the accused. Following the doctrine established in United States vs. Colley, once a court with competent jurisdiction tries, convicts, and sentences a person, that person has been placed in jeopardy for that offense. Therefore, subjecting Tubig to a second trial and punishment for the same act constituted double jeopardy, which is prohibited by law. The defense of former jeopardy was sustained.