G.R. No. 126995, December 15, 1997.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision promulgated on January 29, 1998, which upheld her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 and ordered her to reimburse the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) the amount of P189,372,000.00. Her grounds included: (a) that it was Jose P. Dans, Jr., her co-accused who was acquitted, and not her, who entered into the Lease Agreement (Exh. “B”) on behalf of the LRTA; (b) that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the lease terms were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government; and (c) that the Sandiganbayan’s First Division’s promulgation of the decision after the constitution of a Special Division rendered the judgment null and void. The petitioner argued that since Dans was acquitted and no conspiracy was proven, she should also be exonerated.

ISSUE

The primary issue in this dissenting opinion is whether the acquittal of co-accused Jose P. Dans, Jr., and the alleged procedural anomaly in the Sandiganbayan’s decision-making process warrant the exoneration of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos.

RULING

Justice Romero, in his dissenting opinion, voted to dissent from the majority opinion and upheld the conviction. On the substantive issue, the dissent found that while conspiracy between Marcos and Dans was not proven, petitioner was the Chairman of the LRTA during the negotiations and approved the lease agreement, authorizing Dans to sign for the LRTA. Although she signed the lease as Chairman of the PGH Foundation, Inc. (the lessee), the transaction was tainted by a conflict of interest, as she and Dans held high positions in both the LRTA and PGHFI concurrently. The lease agreement, being a bilateral contract, was entered into on behalf of the government by both parties; thus, petitioner did enter into it. On the procedural issue, the dissent found petitioner’s arguments shallow and self-serving. It held that there is no rule in the Sandiganbayan authorizing or disauthorizing the dissolution of a Special Division once it becomes functus officio, and any procedural lapse would not render the judgment null and void but might only indicate judicial bias addressable in an administrative case. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration should be denied.