GR 1265; (April, 1903) (Digest)
G.R. No. 1265 : April 18, 1903
EVARISTO PAYNAGA, petitioner-appellee, vs. GEORGE N. WOLFE, Warden of Bilibid Prison, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
On January 5, 1898, during the Spanish sovereignty, petitioner Evaristo Paynaga was convicted by ordinary court-martial for the crime of desertion from the Spanish army and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He escaped on October 18, 1898, and was rearrested on January 20, 1903. Paynaga filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Court of First Instance, claiming he was entitled to be discharged under the Amnesty Proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902. The trial court granted his petition, ordering his discharge upon taking the required oath of allegiance. The Government, through the Warden, appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Evaristo Paynaga is entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of July 4, 1902, thereby warranting his release from imprisonment.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ordered the petitioner remanded to custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.
The Court held that the Amnesty Proclamation grants pardon only for offenses related to participation in the insurrections against Spain or the United States, specifically for treason, sedition, and other political offenses committed in the course of those insurrections. The petitioner was convicted of desertion from the Spanish army, a purely military offense under Spanish law, which is not political in character and is not covered by the proclamation. There was no claim that he participated in any insurrection.
Furthermore, the Court, citing Article XII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, ruled that final criminal judgments rendered during Spanish sovereignty must be executed by the succeeding government. Therefore, the United States government is obligated to enforce the sentence imposed by the Spanish authorities.
The Court also addressed a procedural objection, ruling that the law providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings (Act No. 654) is not an ex post facto law as applied to this case, as habeas corpus is a civil proceeding to enforce a civil right, distinct from the original criminal conviction.