G.R. No. 125796, December 27, 2000
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and FLORENCIO CANDIA, Respondents.

FACTS

The Provincial Prosecutor filed an Information for Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder against private respondents and others. The charge stemmed from an armed encounter in 1988 between alleged New People’s Army members, including respondents, and Philippine Army troops, resulting in one soldier’s death and four wounded. The prosecution’s evidence was a joint affidavit from former NPA members. Respondents, without participating in the preliminary investigation, appealed to the Secretary of Justice and later moved before the trial court to compel the prosecutor to amend the Information to charge Rebellion instead, arguing the acts were politically motivated. The trial court denied the motion, upholding the prosecutor’s prerogative.
The Court of Appeals, while agreeing the prosecutor generally has discretion, found grave abuse of that discretion. It ruled the affidavit evidence clearly indicated the incident was a “firefight” between insurgents and government forces, constituting Rebellion, not common crimes. The appellate court thus ordered the prosecutor to file a substitute information for Rebellion. The Provincial Prosecutor elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the public prosecutor to amend the Information from Murder with Frustrated Murder to Rebellion before trial, based solely on the evidence from the preliminary investigation.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ order. The Court held that the determination of probable cause and the choice of what crime to charge based on the evidence are primarily executive functions vested in the public prosecutor. Judicial review of this discretion is limited to instances of grave abuse, which was not present here. The Court reasoned that from the joint affidavit alone, it was not definitively clear that the “firefight” was an act of Rebellion rather than an ambush constituting common crimes. The political motivation or context of the acts is a matter of evidence best threshed out during trial or a bail hearing. At the pre-trial stage, the prosecutor’s assessment that the evidence supported a charge for common crimes was not capricious or whimsical. Respondents were not without remedy, as they could present evidence during trial to prove the acts were in furtherance of rebellion. The prerogative to file the appropriate information remains with the prosecutor.