G.R. No. 125108; August 3, 2000
ALEJANDRA PABLO, petitioner, vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with three separate violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing dishonored checks. The cases were not consolidated. Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City first convicted her in one case (Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D) on June 21, 1995, imposing a fine. Subsequently, Branch 43 of the same RTC convicted her in the two remaining cases on November 28, 1995, imposing prison terms.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation in the two cases decided by Branch 43. The local probation office recommended approval, but the National Probation Office denied the application. Respondent Judge Silverio Q. Castillo, presiding over Branch 43, issued an Order dated March 25, 1996, denying probation, grounded on petitioner’s disqualification under Section 9(c) of the Probation Law (P.D. 968). Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation on the ground of a disqualifying prior conviction under Section 9(c) of P.D. 968.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The denial was legally sound. Section 9(c) of P.D. 968 clearly disqualifies an applicant who has “previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos.”
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument for a liberal interpretation, contending that her multiple convictions arose from a single transaction and thus should not count as a “previous conviction.” The law’s language is plain and unambiguous. The term “previous” refers to the date of conviction, not the date of the crime’s commission or whether the offenses arose from a single act. When petitioner applied for probation in the two cases before Branch 43 on November 28, 1995, she already had a final conviction from Branch 41 dated June 21, 1995. This prior conviction squarely placed her under the disqualification clause.
The Court distinguished the cited case of Rura vs. Lopeña, where the accused had no prior final judgment when he applied, as his multiple convictions were consolidated and rendered in a single decision on the same date. Here, petitioner’s convictions were rendered in separate decisions on different dates, making the first one a disqualifying “previous conviction.” The Probation Law is not a penal statute requiring liberal construction; its clear provisions must be applied as written. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.