GR 123944; (February, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 123944 , February 12, 1998
SGS FAR EAST LTD., NEIL TOVEY AND RAMON GO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS OPERATIONS MANAGER AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGER, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNIONS-FED (PSSLU) AND ITS FOUR MEMBERS CRISANTO ORTIZ, MAURICIO FORBES, JR., ARTURO GALLARDO AND TONY LIM, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
On February 2, 1982, a complaint for underpayment of wages and violation of labor standard laws (NLRC Case No. NCR-2-2095-82) was filed by the union and thirteen members. The case was amicably settled on August 4, 1982, via a Compromise Agreement which affirmed the complainants’ status as regular seasonal daily-paid employees, provided for a payment of P50,000.00 in full settlement of all money claims, and stipulated that the employer would give the complainants priority in hiring for regular monthly-paid field vacancies. The case was dismissed.
Three years later, on August 16, 1985, four of the complainants (Ortiz, Forbes, Jr., Lim, and Gallardo) filed a Manifestation and Motion before Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon, alleging that SGS did not allow them to work, failed to comply with wage orders, did not give them priority in employment, and violated the Compromise Agreement. SGS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On February 6, 1989, Labor Arbiter Tumanon denied the motion and ordered SGS to pay the four complainants monetary claims, reinstate them with three years backwages, and comply strictly with the Compromise Agreement.
SGS appealed to the NLRC, which reversed Tumanon on August 8, 1991, ruling he had no jurisdiction and that a new case should be filed. The union’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The union then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 101698). On March 23, 1994, the Supreme Court set aside the NLRC ruling, affirmed Labor Arbiter Tumanon’s decision, and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
After entry of judgment, the case was referred to Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes for execution. The parties submitted computations: private respondents computed P4,806,052.41, while petitioners computed P298,552.48. On October 18, 1994, Labor Arbiter Reyes issued an order approving the private respondents’ computation of P4,806,052.41 and directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
Petitioners appealed this Writ of Execution to the NLRC (Second Division) on November 21, 1994, contending the award was unreasonable, excessive, and varied the tenor of the judgment. On December 11, 1995, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, holding that an order of execution is final and the Commission had lost jurisdiction. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on January 18, 1996.
ISSUE
Whether the public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners’ appeal against the Writ of Execution which allegedly varied the judgment sought to be enforced.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the NLRC resolutions dated December 11, 1995 and January 18, 1996, and remanded the case to the NLRC for further proceedings.
The Court ruled that while the general principle is that a writ of execution of a final judgment is a ministerial duty, this rule does not apply where the writ of execution is assailed as having varied the decision. Petitioners vigorously assailed the correctness of Labor Arbiter Reyes’s computation, alleging it materially altered the decision of Labor Arbiter Tumanon, specifically regarding the salary rate for computing three years backwages and the award of 200% monthly basic pay for every year of service. If these allegations are correct, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC is vested with authority to review the correctness of the execution of a decision and consider supervening events affecting such execution. Where an execution is not in harmony with the judgment and exceeds it, it has no validity. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over the appeal.
